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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN DEFAMATION LITIGATION:
A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO
FREEDOM OF SPEECH*
DEFAMATION is the tort of communicating material which is injurious to a
person's reputation.' If the communication is libelous 2 or slanderous per se a
general damages will be imposed according to the jury's estimate of the
plaintiff's injury.4 And if the plaintiff can show specific financial injury
*Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
1. Rocky Mountain News Printing Co. v. Fridborn, 46 Colo. 440, 104 Pac. 956 (1909):
PROSSER, TORTS § 91 (1941); HARPER, TORTS § 235 (1933). The term includes not only
natural persons but also corporations and partnerships. Ohio and M. Ry. Co. v. Press
Pub. Co., 48 Fed. 206 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891); New York Society for the Suppression of
Vice v. MacFadden Publications, 221 N.Y. Supp. 563, 129 Misc. 408 (1927).
2. Libel originally consisted of written defamatory matter. Recently it has conic to
include other defamations which are similar to writing or printing in their permanence
of form or potentiality of harm. Libel is divided into two categories: matter which is
"libelous upon [its] face" HARPER, TORTS §273 (1933), often called libel per se, e.g.,
Pandolfo v. Bank of Benson, 273 Fed. 48 (1921), and matter which is libelous only with
reference to a particular individual, situation or context, e.g., Lemmer v. The Tribune, 50
Mont. 559, 148 Pac. 338 (1915). This latter category is sometimes called libel per quod. Flake
v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 785, 195 S.E. 55, 59 (1938). A few courts
have apparently held that libel per quod is actionable only when there is proof of special
damages. See id. See also Note, 26 IOWA L. REv. 893 (1941) ; Note, 25 Micn. L. Ray,
551 (1927). The general rule is that no allegation of special damages is required in any
libel suit. McCoRmicK, DAMAGES § 113 (1935).
3. Slander historically meant oral defamation. However, the distinction between
slander and libel is now unclear in certain areas. See PROSSER, TORTS § 92 (1941).
An action for slander may be brought without alleging special damages only where the
slander is actionable per se. Included in this category are slanders imputing serious crime,
Earley v. Winn, 129 Wis. 291, 109 N.W. 633 (1906), loathsome disease, Sally v. Brown,
220 Ky. 576, 295 S.W. 890 (1927), unchastity, Battles v. Tyson, 77 Neb. 563, 110 N.W.
299 (1906), or harming one's repute in trade, business or profession, Hickerson v. Masters,
190 Ky. 168, 226 S.W. 1072 (1921).
4. "Where words are published of the plaintiff which constituted a libel .... the law
presumes that the plaintiff has been damaged, without proof of any special damage, be-
cause the law takes notice of the fact that a libel travels, and it comes to a great
many different readers, and that it would be impossible for a plaintiff to trace out tie
circulation of the libel, and show by whom it had been read, and how it had affected
their opinion of him and all that; so that the jury are justified in allowing substantial dam-
ages to a plaintiff against whom a libel has been published, without proof of any particular
or substantial damages to him." Washington Post v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290, 292 (1919).
Mental suffering, decline of repute, and probable decline of financial status are covered
by general damages. Stevenson v. Hearst Consol. Publications, 214 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 874 (1954); Craney v. Donavan, 92 Conn. 236, 102 Atl. 640
(1917); Poleski v. Polish American Pub. Co., 254 Mich. 15, 235 N.W. 841 (1931). See
also McCoRmICx, DAMAGES § 116 (1935) ; THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS § 57
(1950) ; 22 CoLum. L. Rlv. 678 (1922) ; 8 CoaRu.L L.Q. 65 (1922) ; 36 HARV. L. Rgv. 220
(1922); 3 U. NEWARK L. REv. 182 (1938).
NOTES
special damages are also available in these cases and in the remaining slander
actions.- Both general and special damages are compensatory awards designed
primarily to rehabilitate the injured party and only incidentally to punish the
tortfeasor. 6 Where the jury finds that the defendant's conduct was particularly
reprehensible or malicious it may also impose punitive damages.Y Such dam-
ages are designed to punish wrongdoers,8 to discourage similar torts,O and
to encourage private policing in fields where suitable public action is not
practical.10
In the recent case of Reynolds v. Pegler,1 plaintiff alleged that defendants
had written, published, and disseminated material injurious to plaintiff's repu-
tation- 2 The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded him nominal damages
of one dollar against each of the three defendants."3 Punitive damages totalling
$175,000 were also assessed against the defendants. 14 The defense moved to
set aside the verdict on the ground that punitive damages were excessive in
view of the assessment of only nominal general damages. The court refused
to disturb the jury's award of punitive damages because the amount was not so
dearly "excessive as to shock the judicial conscience."' 5
5. Special damages are only awarded when actual financial injury is proved. HArIL1m,
ToRTs § 242 (1933).
6. Cf. Morris, Punitihe Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. RIri. 1173 (1931);
'Morris, Rough Justice and Some Utopian Ideas, 24 ILL L Rzv. 730 (1930).
7. Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co., 36 Xev. 247, 134 Pac. 753 (1913). See aho Mc-
CoRa icx, DAf.AGES § 79 (1935) ; Note, 10 BRooKmy L Rzv. 292 (1941) ; 3 U. NwAm-
L. REv. 182 (1938). Several states have general code provisions which specifically authorize
punitive damages. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (1949).
8. Voltz v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 332 Pa. 141, 2 A.2d 697 (1933).
9. Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1933).
10. Neal v. Newburger, 154 Miss. 691, 123 So. 861 (1929). See McCou.triciz, D t, t
§ 77 (1935).
11. 123 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
12. The author was columnist Westbrook Pegler. The Hearst Corp. distributed the
columns in which the defamatory material appeared to 186 newspapers with a combined
nationwide circulation of 12,000,000. And Hearst Consolidated Publications published
the column in its newspaper having a circulation of 743,000. Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F.
Supp. 36,41 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
13. "Nominal damages are a sum which is held to be recoverable where a legal right
is to be vindicated against an invasion which has produced no actual present loss of any
kind." Press v. Davis, 118 S.W.2d 982, 995 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). See also 10 Noram
D~Ara LAw. 133, 134 n.1 (1935) ; 18 U. Cix. L. Ray. 545 (1949). "Small damages, how-
ever, and nominal damages do not mean the same thing." Chapin v. Babcock, 67 Conn. 255,
257, 34 Atl. 1039 (1896).
14. The award was apportioned as follows: $100,000 against defendant Pegler, $30,000
against the Hearst Corporation, and $25,000 against Hearst Consolidated Publication-.
Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
15. Ibid. The court held that no relationship between punitive and actual damages was
necessary and that "there are of course, limits upon the jury's power; but unless the amount
of the penalty is so clearly excessive as to compel the conclusion that it is the result of
passion or prejudice, its award should not be disturbed." Id. at 39.
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The rationale of punitive damage awards is seriously to be questioned.10
Punishment should have little place in civil actions, which are designed
primarily to make whole the injured party.' 7 The deterrent value of punitive
damages is negligible.' 8 And in almost all cases in which such damages may
be awarded appropriate criminal action could be taken with more desirable
results.' 9 Moreover, puntive damages are assessed in civil trials in which
the defendant is deprived of the guarantees present in a criminal proceding.20
And punitive awards may be imposed in addition to criminal penalties. For
all practical purposes this subjects the defendant to double jeopardy for the
same offense.21 Finally, there is no justification for plaintiff's enrichment by
16. See McCoRMIC, DAMAGES § 77 (1935).
17. The theory and purpose of the two actions differ. "Ordinarily the administration
of the laws is divided into two distinct jurisdictions, the civil and the criminal, each governed
by rule of procedure and by rules governing the admission and weight of testimony different
and distinct from the other .... And it is to the criminal and not to the civil jurisdiction
that society looks for its protection against criminals." Spokane Truck and Dray Co. v.
Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 53 (1891).
18. Certain tortfeasors can be classed as "situational" or "overloaded" offenders who
will not repeat the offense. Others will do so regardless of the punitive damages. The latter is
true of certain publications, for example, which thrive despite libel suits and may even
set aside a contingency fund for this purpose. In the field of newspaper libel, the develop-
ment of "libel insurance" further reduces the sting of damage assessments. See Donnelly,
The Right of Reply: Ain Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. lnv. 867 (1948).
And publishing concerns often bind themselves contractually to pay damages imposed
on their columnists.
19. "[T]he law makes adequate provision . . . in the way of a criminal prosecution,
for the protection of the community, [and] there can be no reason why relief should not
be sought in each case in the manner thus provided." Vincent v. Morgan's Louisiana
& T.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 1041, 74 So. 541, 545 (1917).
"Mais comme l'usage des Peines doit tre r~gl6 sur l'utilite publique, et non pas sur
]a passion ou sur la caprice des particuliers; un juge ne fait pas bien laisser une telle chose
en la disposition de la personne lz6e." ("But as the infliction of punishment should be admin-
istered with a view to the public good, and not with a view to the bassion or caprice of individ-
uals, the judge ought not to leave such a matter to the determination of the injured person.")
PUFFENDORF, LE DaOIT DE LA NATURE ET DES GENs 281 (1706), quoted in Fay v. Parker,
53 N.H. 342, 355 (1872).
It is not suggested, however, that criminal action should be substituted for punitive
damages in all fields. See text at notes 34-35 infra.
20. In civil actions there is no requirement of a grand jury indictment, no right to
refuse to reply on the grounds of self-incrimination, no possibility of executive pardon, no
statutory limit on fines, and the mere preponderance of the evidence test rather than the
stricter criminal one, is applied. See Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 391-92 (1872).
21. "If [defendant] is made to pay a fine (denominated exemplary, [or] punitory
.. ) ... he has been just as muh punished as if he had paid to the state the fine ...
The punishment is the same to the offender ... whether [it] enures to the benefit of an
individual or of the public." Id. at 390. See Aldridge, The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary
Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20 IND. L.J. 123 (1945); 21 NoTmiu DAntE LAW. 20b
(1946). However the imposition of punitive damages and a criminal fine for the same
offense does not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. See Brown




his appropriation of damages imposed on the defendant because of "public
policy and not on the ground that the plaintiff has any right to the money."22
Punitive damages are particularly objectionable in defamation litigation.
Although compensation for injury caused by libel or slander is undoubtedly
proper, an additional award to punish the tortfeasor is neither necessary nor
desirable. Libel and slander actions restrict the free expression of ideas.P
Concededly some legal curtailment of abusive communication is necessary
but every additional restraint lessens the scope of free discussion.2 4 And puni-
tive damages readily lend themselves to an unreasonable restriction of free
speech, for where the defendant represents minority views the popularity
of those views may be on trial.25 The jury can award large punitive damages
to cripple further activities, whereas compensatory damages alone would often
be too small to accomplish this result.2 6 A punitive damage award that is not
so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience may be a sufficient financial
burden to silence a voice of dissent. 27
22. New York Evening Post Co. v. Chaloner, 265 Fed. 204, 220 (2d Cir. 1920).
"[W]e are at a loss to know by what process of reasoning, either legal or ethical, the
conclusion is reached that a plaintiff in a civil action,... is allowed to appropriate money
which is supposed to be paid for the benefit of the state." Spokane Truck and Dray Co.
v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 53 (1891). And see Morris, Puniltke Damages in Tort Cases, 44
H v. L. REv. 1173, 1178 (1931). But see text at note 10 supra.
23. Although some courts have stressed the dichotomy between free speech and defa-
marion, others have recognized their close interrelation. See, e.g., Brandreth v. Lance, 8
Paige 24, 34 Am. Dec. 368 (N.Y. 1839) ; Coeur D'Alene Consolidated & Mining Co. v.
Miners' Union, 51 Fed. 260, 267 (C.C. Idaho 1S92) ; Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical
Union, 45 Fed. 135, 141-42 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1891).
This connection is further illustrated by the extension of privilege for certain libelous
communications on the ground that in balance the benefit to the public is greater than
the harm to the defamed. Foster v. Scripps, 39 Mich. 376, 383 (1878) (concurring
opinion). See HARPER, ToRis § 247 (1933); PaossER, Tors § 94 (1941). See also
Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Proposals for Reform, 23 Mxx. L. REv. 609 (1949) ;
Hall, Preserving Liberty of the Press by the Dcfense of Privilege in Libel Actions, 26
CALIn. L. Ray. 226 (1938); Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HAte. L Rav. 413
(1910).
24. "Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate."
Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
25. "[W]here the defendant is a commanding, popular, influential person, and the
plaintiff of the opposite character, and the local and temporary excitement or prejudice
of the time happens to be in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, the jury is
apt to be reluctant in giving even pecuniary compensation, without adding anything by
way of exemplary or punitive damages; while, in a case in which the character of the
parties and the circumstances are reversed, the jury will be liable to push their pu%%er
to unwarranted and unconscionable extent .... " Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51, 57
(1878).
26. It is reported that in an award against the periodical "The Churchman," compen-
satory damages of $0 were accompanied by punitive damages set at $10,000. See Don-
nelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L REV. 867,
878 n.29 (1948).
27. "The possibility of libel suits or threats ot libei suits being used to put some paper
or columnists out of business is not to be dismissed lightly. . .. Minority groups, in
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Existing legal rules governing the impostion of punitive damages are insuf-
ficient to protect the expression of unpopular views. Punitive damages may
usually be assessed where there is any award of general or special damages 28
and in some jurisdictions even this may not be necessary.20 Thus although
the plaintiff has suffered little or no actual damage as a result of defendant's
actions the jury can impose a punitive damage award of tens of thousands
of dollars.80 Many courts state that a reasonable relationship between punitive
and compensatory damages should exist,31 but an analysis of the cases indicates
no fixed proportion prevailing between the two.82 Trial and appellate courts
have disallowed or reduced punitive damage awards deemed excessive but
such holdings have not been based upon any clearly expressed criteria.011
particular, are adversely affected by the libel laws. The smaller journals, struggling
along on subsidies or barely managing on their own, are highly vulnerable to libel
suits whereas the large enterprises either have no crusading spirit or else can stand the
expense of litigation." Id. at 878. Punitive damage awards of $1,000-$5,000 might easily
be considered as within the jury's discretion and yet effectively cripple many small publi-
cations.
28. In most jurisdictions an award of only nominal damages suffices to support
punitive damages. However, a minority of states prohibit punitive damages where there
are no actual damages. If actual damages are found, no matter how small, punitive
damages may be imposed in almost all jurisdictions. See 1 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 107
(1951) ; Comment, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 517 (1953) ; 16 MiNN. L. REv. 438 (1932) ; 7 Ruamts
L. REv. 414 (1953) ; 10 TEXAs L. REv. 238 (1932) ; 18 U. CIN. L. REV. 545 (1949).
29. Wardman-Justice Motors v. Petrie, 39 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1930) (proof of
actual loss sufficient to uphold punitive damages even though no actual damages were
awarded by jury) ; Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279, 9 P.2d 505 (1932) (entire jury award
labeled punitive but court assumed a portion of this was intended as compensatory);
McConathy v. Deck, 34 Colo. 461, 83 Pac. 135 (1905) ($500 exemplary award upheld on
theory that actual damages occurred although it was not shown in pecuniary terms or
awarded by jury). A recurring rationale in these minority cases is that actual damages
did occur even though not specifically assessed. See Comment, 17 IOWA L. REv. 413
(1932) ; Comment, 23 ROCKY Mr. L. Rv. 206 (1950).
30. In the Reynolds case the jury awarded plaintiff $175,000 punitive damages al-
though its award of only $1 as general and special damages indicates that it found that
Reynolds had suffered no actual injury as a result of defendant's activities.
31. E.g., Crowell-Collier Pub. Co. v. Caldwell, 170 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1948);
Thompson v. Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n, 83 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Iowa 1949);
Luke v. Mercantile Acceptance Corp. 111 Cal. App. 2d 431, 244 P.2d 764 (1952).
32. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Hearst Consol. Publications, 214 F.2d 902, 910-12 (2d
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 874 (1954) ; Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576, 587-88 (7th
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953) ; Scalise v. National Utility Service, 120 F.2d
938, 940-41 (5th Cir. 1941).
33. Different verbal standards have been used by appellate courts in reversing jury
awards on the ground of excessiveness. See Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., 116
F.2d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 1941) ("an injustice has been done") ; Livesy v. Stock, 208 Cal.
315, 322, 281 Pac. 70, 73 (1929) ("jury ... prompted by prejudice or passion") ; Crane v.
Bennett, 77 App. Div. 102, 112, 79 N.Y. Supp. 66, 74 (1st Dep't 1902) ("enormous").
Cf. Affolder v. New York C. & St. L.R. Co., 339 U.S. 96, 101 (1950) ("monstrous") ;
Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 1951) ("grossly excessive").
See 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 59, p. 3834 (2d ed. 1953), for a discussion of the
variance in attitudes among the circuits. Stevenson v. Hearst Consol. Publications, supra
[Vol. 64
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Therefore the reduction of particular awards has done little to establish stand-
ards for future application and generalizations from such decisions are of
doubtful value.
Since appellate courts have no power to abolish punitive damages,14 state
legislatures should act to protect freedom of speech by abolishing such awards
in libel and slander actions. However, this action should not be coupled vith
an increase in criminal libel prosecutions. The danger of such prosecutions
lies in the constant pressure on government officials to retaliate against critics
and in the superior resources which these officials have available to silence
their opponents. Therefore criminal libel actions often become tools of political
warfare.35 Civil actions may duplicate this situation, for there are well-
financed, highly organized, and resourceful private interest groups which might
attempt to enforce their views or force others to withhold opinion by bringing
or threatening such suits. In both criminal and civil actions mass antagonism
may be critically reflected in jury attitudes. Since both actions inhibit freedom
of expression, abolition of punitive damages in civil actions should be accom-
panied by a continued reluctance on the part of enforcenent officers to under-
take criminal libel prosecutions.
The rules governing the imposition of damages in defamation actions should
also be amended to insure adequate compensation to injured plaintiffs. Juries
may currently be awarding punitive damages to cover the actual outlays in-
volved in defamation litigation, since these expenditures cannot be recovered
as costs in most jurisdictions. Therefore legislation eliminating punitive
damages should authorize juries to award an amount equal to the actual ex-
penses of litigation.38 Juries should also be empowered to give the plaintiff
a right of reply 37 and to order a published retraction.38 Such action would
note 32, is typical of the reluctance of the Second Circuit to tamper with damage verdicts.
Bucher -% Krause, supra note 32, illustrates the position of the more willing Seventh
Circuit.
34. "[C]ourts have frankly stated their repugnance to the doctrine, yet considered
themselves bound by former decisions in their respective states to still maintain it, appeal-
ing to the legislature to relieve them from what they believe to be a pernicious practice."
Spokane Truck and Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 51 (1891). Moreover !everal
states have statutes which specifically authorize punitive damages.
35. The political nature of criminal libel actions is indicated by an analysis of repre-
sentative cases. See Note, 52 COLum. L. Rzv. 521, 530 n.75 (1952).
36. In one jurisdiction, Connecticut, "punitive damages" may be awarded only to the
extent of costs and legal expenses. This is true of all torts. Craney v. Donavan, 92 Cunn.
236, 102 At. 640 (1917). But cf. Coxx. GEN. StAr. §§ 8305-10, 8312 (1949). Such ex-
penses should include reasonable amounts for attorney's fees, pretrial investigation and
discovery, travel and subsistence of witnesses, court costs, outlays for transcript and ex-
hibits, and other expenditures incidental to the successful prosecution of the action.
37. See Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to on Action for Libel, 34 V,.
L. REv. 867 (1948).
38. In many jurisdictions retraction of libel prior to litigation mitigates damages.
See Id. at 893 nn.51, 52.
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facilitate vindication of impecunious plaintiffs and thus eliminate situations
where even a certain victory is too costly to induce one to clear his name.
State legislatures should adopt statutes which provide substantially as
follows:
Section X) Only compensatory damages and the damages provided in Sec-
tion Y may be awarded in civil actions alleging libel and/or slander (defama-
tion).
Section Y) The jury may in its discretion direct defendant to:
a) pay plaintiff a sum of money equal to the expenses of bringing the suit;
b) communicate a retraction of defamatory matter in such length and
position, and at such time and frequency, as the jury shall determine; and
c) permit plaintiff to reply to defendant in such length and position, and
at such time and frequency as the jury shall determine.39
39. Right of reply is usually taken to mean that one deeming himself defamed may
answer the defaming publication without bringing suit. One state now has a statute
authorizing this limited concept of the right of reply. NFV. CoMI'. LAws § 10506 (1929).
In the proposed statute the jury would be able to make the right of reply available to
the injured party after suit is brought as a means of completely vindicating his rights.
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